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ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. PENA: THE
ARMAGEDDON OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
INTRODUCTION
The battle over affirmative action is currently raging in both the
legal and political arenas. The United States Supreme Court at-
tempted to resolve this conflict with its decision in Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena.' In Adarand, the Court determined that strict
scrutiny2 is the appropriate standard of review for federally created
affirmative action programs.3 This decision, taken together with the
Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.4 renders any
race-based legislation, instituted by either the federal or local govern-
ment, subject to the most searching judicial inquiry. Although tradi-
tional constitutional jurisprudence illustrates that legislation rarely
passes strict scrutiny,5 the Court left that determination to the lower
court on remand.6 Thus, questions remain as to the ramifications of
the decision in Adarand: by imposing strict scrutiny has the Court
delivered the final, deadly blow to affirmative action? Or, does af-
firmative action still have some life?
This Note focuses on three issues which are prevalent in the affirm-
ative action battle and which have played an important role in the
Court's decision in Adarand: (1) the practicality of standards of re-
view and the application of strict scrutiny in the equal protection con-
text; (2) the role of the Supreme Court in the political arena with
regard to the appropriate amount of deference to be given to Con-
gress; and (3) the doctrine of stare decisis and its future after
Adarand.
In addressing these issues, Part I of this Note begins by providing
the reader with a historical overview of the Supreme Court's affirma-
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (defining strict scrutiny as requiring the gov-
ernment to prove that it has a compelling state interest in enacting the legislation, and that the
means by which this interest is achieved are narrowly tailored).
3. 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
4. 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
decision in Croson to apply strict scrutiny to a race-based affirmative action program instituted
by a municipality).
5. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text (discussing the application of strict scrutiny
and its practical effects).
6. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118.
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tive action jurisprudence in order to highlight the indeterminate na-
ture of the Court's decisions in this area. Part I then discusses the
foundational underpinnings of standards of review, the development
of the relationship between Congress and the Court, and the doctrine
of stare decisis.
In light of this background, Part II briefly reviews the lower court's
opinion in Adarand, then focuses on the arguments articulated by the
Supreme Court Justices. Part III analyzes and critiques the arguments
of the Justices with respect to the three issues presented. This section
of the Note also provides alternatives to the Court's decision and eval-
uates the feasibility of these alternatives. Finally, Part IV examines
the practical impact of the Adarand decision and its influence on the
lower courts.
The author ultimately concludes that Adarand was incorrectly de-
cided. The application of strict scrutiny to federally enacted affirma-
tive action programs demonstrates a blatant disregard of the present
effects of racial discrimination, the ability of Congress to remedy this
discrimination, and past judicial precedent. This decision will result in
the unnecessary demise of beneficial affirmative action programs.
The author proposes that the inherent problems of this decision could
have been eliminated by the application of intermediate scrutiny to
affirmative action programs.
1. BACKGROUND
A. The Roots of Affirmative Action
The foundation of affirmative action lies in the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment which provides that "[n]o state shall.., deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'7
Known as the Equal Protection Clause, this language serves a dual
function. Not only does it protect individuals from discrimination,8 it
also allows the government to institute affirmative remedial measures
to combat discrimination. 9 This duality, however, results in a dichot-
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. This same requirement is imposed on the federal gov-
ernment through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (prohibiting the federal government from segregating public schools on the basis of
race under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
8. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a statute which prohibited interra-
cial marriages as violative of the Equal Protection Clause); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880) (utilizing the Equal Protection Clause to strike down a statute which allowed only
Caucasian persons to serve on juries).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., Swann v. Charolette Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971) (mandating the desegregation of schools through specific remedial measures);
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (providing school authorities with a
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omy. Remedial, affirmative action measures come into direct conflict
with the concept of colorblindness expressed by Justice Harlan almost
one hundred years ago in Plessy v. Ferguson.10 Justice Harlan stated:
"Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens."' 1 As this Note demonstrates, the conse-
quences of this dichotomy are evident throughout affirmative action
jurisprudence. 12
The practice of government, federal or local, taking affirmative
measures to remedy the effects of past discrimination was firmly es-
tablished by the school desegregation cases.13 In Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown II),14 the United States Supreme Court recognized
that race-conscious remedies were necessary to eliminate segrega-
tion. 15 Remedial measures, however, did not remain confined to the
arena of school desegregation. From the idea of equality of opportu-
nity, inherent in the desegregation cases, the Court logically
progressed to the acceptance of the goal of equality of result in affirm-
ative action. 16 The doctrine of "benign"'17 remedial measures was ex-
time-table for desegregating their schools); see generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and
the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (arguing that
the simultaneous enactment of the Freedmen Bureau Act and the Fourteenth Amendment
demonstrate that Congress intended race-conscious remedies to be permissible under the Four-
teenth Amendment).
10. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 19-38 and accompanying text (demonstrating instances where the Court
had difficulty resolving affirmative action cases).
13. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (requiring that the
school board institute effective remedies to decrease segregation); Swann v. Charolette Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding the use of race-conscious remedies to eliminate
segregation in schools); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (in-
structing lower courts to implement desegregation "with all deliberate speed").
14. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
15. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's rationale in Plessy v.
Ferguson, and its subsequent abandonment of the doctrine of "separate but equal" in Brown).
16. See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACnON AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
CONsTrTUTIONAL INouIRY 163-65 (1991) (asserting that there is a logical progression from de-
segregation to affirmative action due to an underlying desire to assure equality of opportunity);
see also Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of
Constitutional Equality, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 1729, 1778-86 (1989) (stating that equality of result, or
affirmative action, is the extra step required when equality of opportunity has been denied for a
prolonged period).
17. On the simplest level, a "benign" racial classification can be defined as a "good intention,"
while an invidious racial classification is defined as a "bad" one. See Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2121 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Adarand, Justice Stevens criti-
cized the majority's view that "benign" and "invidious" discrimination cannot be easily differen-
tiated. Id. Justice Stevens stated:
[The Court's application of strict scrutiny] would treat a Dixiecrat Senator's decision to
vote against Thurgood Marshall's confirmation in order to keep African Americans off
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tended to school admissions as well as employment and also resulted
in the creation of minority set-aside programs.18 As the scope of the
doctrine of affirmative action expanded, however, the remedial/color-
blind dichotomy presented the Court with considerable difficulty in
adjudicating these issues. 19
The case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2° was
the first time the Court articulated its views on affirmative action.2' In
Bakke, a medical school applicant raised an equal protection chal-
lenge to the admissions program at the University of California at Da-
vis, which reserved spaces in the incoming class for minority
students.22 While no majority opinion was reached,2 3 in his plurality
opinion, Justice Powell rejected the argument that "discrimination
against [the] members of the white 'majority' cannot be suspect if its
purpose can be characterized as 'benign. ' ' 24 Thus, Justice Powell
called for the most exacting judicial examination. 25 Although Justice
Powell agreed with the dissenting Justices that the goal of diversity
the Supreme Court as on par with President Johnson's evaluation of his nominee's race
as a positive factor. It would equate a law that made black citizens ineligible for mili-
tary service with a program aimed at recruiting black soldiers ......
ld.: see also infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens' critique of the
majority's consistency theory).
In contrast, Justice Thomas espoused the view that "whether a law relying upon racial taxon-
omy is 'benign' or 'malign' either turns on 'whose ox is gored' or on distinctions found only in
the eye of the beholder." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119-20 n* (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
18. See Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-651 (1994) (providing that socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals have the opportunity to participate in the performance of federal
contracts).
19. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding, in a five-to-four
decision, that racially preferential layoffs for public school teachers were unconstitutional); Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal minority set-
aside program for public works projects in a six-to-three decision, but unable to reach a majority
opinion); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (deciding that a preferential
treatment program in university admissions was invalid, but four of the Justices believed the
program was only invalid on statutory grounds).
20. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
21. But cf DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (refusing to address the issue of the
constitutionality of affirmative action in a school admissions case since the issue had become
moot).
22. 438 U.S. at 272-75.
23. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Burger, and Stewart argued that the legality
of the affirmative action program was not at issue; rather, the program should be held invalid
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
24. Id. at 294; see infra note 64 (defining suspect class).
25. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297-320.
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may be a sufficiently compelling interest,26 he found "the use of a
quota system unconstitutional. '27 In contrast, the dissenting Justices
rejected the notion that colorblindness should bar remedial meas-
ures.28 Rather, they would have upheld the program after applying
intermediate scrutiny.29 The Court's inability to reach a consensus in
Bakke is characteristic of its disjointed treatment of affirmative
action.30
Shortly after Bakke, the Court was faced with a challenge to the
constitutionality of a program which set aside government funding for
minorities. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,31 the Court, in a six-to-three de-
cision, upheld a federal provision which required that ten percent of
the federal funds that were allocated for local public works projects be
used to procure services from Minority Business Enterprises
(MBEs).32 Instead of imposing a designated standard of review, the
Court applied a two-step test to reach this result. First, it asked
whether the "objectives of this legislation are within the power of Con-
gress."'33 Second, it asked "whether the limited use of racial and eth-
nic criteria ... is a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the
congressional objectives and does not violate the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. '' 34
The Court held that this legislation was within the spending power of
26. Justice Powell explained that attainment of a diverse student body is a compelling interest
because it promotes academic freedom, which is a special concern of the First Amendment. Id.
at 311-12. Academic freedom, according to Justice Powell, allows the university to select its own
student body. Id.
27. Id. at 315-19. Justice Powell described the special admissions program at issue: "[there
were] 16 special admissions seats [reserved for minority applicants], white applicants could com-
pete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants." Id.
at 289. Justice Powell found that a system such as this was unconstitutional since it "focused
solely on ethnic diversity." Id. at 315. Rather, a system such as the one instituted at Harvard
College was preferabie. Id. at 316-17. Under the Harvard admissions program, race or ethnic
background was considered a "plus," but the applicant would still be compared to "all other
candidates for the available seats." Id.
28. Id. at 327. Justice Brennan stated that "we cannot ... let color blindness become myopia
which masks the reality that many 'created equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as
inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens." Id.
29. Id. at 357-62.
30. See supra note 19 (noting other cases where the Court had difficulty adjudicating in the
area of affirmative action).
31. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
32. Id. at 453-54. An MBE was described as "a business at least 50 per centum of which is
owned by minority group members .... [M]inority group members are citizens of the United
States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Id. at 454
(quoting Section 103(f)(2) of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91
Stat. 116.)
33. Id. at 473.
34. Id.
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Congress. 35 The Court also rejected the contention that Congress, in
invoking this power, "must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion" and,
thus, found Congress' actions constitutional. 36 The concurring Jus-
tices, who had dissented in Bakke, reiterated the fact that intermedi-
ate scrutiny is the proper constitutional standard for dealing with
racial classifications that confer benefits on minorities.37
After Fullilove, the Court remained sharply fragmented in its af-
firmative action decisions and, consequently, was unable to reach a
majority with respect to the standard to be applied.38 It was not until
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.39 that the Court finally reached a
consensus. There, a majority of the Court, in a five-to-four decision,
firmly concluded that any race-based affirmative action program en-
acted by a municipality must be subject to strict scrutiny.40 The Court
maintained that the affirmative action plan in question was not justi-
fied by a compelling governmental interest because there was no pre-
cise evidence of prior discrimination. 41 In addition, the thirty-percent
set-aside was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish a reme-
dial purpose.42 The dissent, composed of the same core of Justices,
35. Id. at 475. The Spending Power is the power to "provide for ... general welfare of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Court noted that "Congress has frequently
employed the Spending Power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of fed-
eral moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative direc-
tives." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474. The MBE provision at issue was structured in this way, and the
Court mentioned that it had upheld the use of this technique in the past. Id.
36. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482. In order to support this proposition, the Court relied on Swann
v. Charolette Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1971), which allowed race to be
considered in formulating a remedy for school desegregation. Id.
37. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
38. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 1729-31 (discussing the divisiveness of the Court in the
area of affirmative action which existed until City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469
(1989), where the Court finally agreed on a standard of review); see, e.g., United States v. Para-
dise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding, in a five-to-four decision, the use of numerical promotion
preferences for state troopers); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986)
(upholding, in a five-to-four decision, the use of numerical hiring goals); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion) (striking down a race-conscious preferential lay-
off program, in a five-to-four decision, although no majority opinion was reached as to the ap-
propriate standard of review).
39. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
40. Id. at 493-94.
41. Id. at 509-10. In order for the city's interest in remedying discrimination in the awarding
of public construction contracts to be "compelling," the Court maintained that the city would
have needed to prove that "qualified minority contractors [had] been passed over for city con-
tracts or subcontracts, either as a group or in any individual case." Id. The city would also have
needed to present evidence as to "how many minority enterprises are present in the local con-
struction market [and their level of participation]." Id. This language demonstrated the Court's
search for statistical proof.
42. Id. at 507. In analyzing the "narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny, the Court asserted
that the city could have used race-neutral alternatives to increase minority participation in con-
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including Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, again criticized
the use of strict scrutiny for race-conscious remedial measures.4 3
The scope of the holding in Croson, however, was limited one year
later in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.4 4 The Court in Metro Broad-
casting invoked intermediate scrutiny45 and held that using race as a
factor for broadcast license applications did not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.46 Broadcast diversity, according to the Court, was an
important governmental objective 47 and therefore met the relevant
test.4 8 What distinguished this case from Croson was that Congress,
not the municipality, had enacted the remedial measure.49 A four-
Justice dissent 50 maintained that, under Croson, the appropriate stan-
dard of review should have been strict scrutiny, regardless of which
tracting. Id. at 509. The Court offered that instead of race-conscious quotas, the city could have
provided financing for small firms generally and, thus, could have achieved the same result of
greater minority participation. Id. at 510. In addition, the Court stated that to pass strict scru-
tiny, the scheme would have needed to allow for a waiver of the set-aside provision as seen in
Fullilove. Id. at 508. If there was no evidence that the MBE had been affected by past discrimi-
natory action, then the set-aside provision would not be applicable. Id. at 507-08.
43. Id. at 553. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun are the same Justices who had ad-
hered to the application of intermediate scrutiny in Bakke and Fullilove. In Bakke, this group
argued: "because of the significant risk that racial classifications established for ostensibly be-
nign purposes can be misused .... an important and articulated purpose for its use must be
shown." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). This core then became part of the majority in Fullilove, which upheld a federally enacted
affirmative action program on the basis that Congress was given the authority to enact these
programs. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Fullilove decision, which
upheld the federal enactment of a minority set-aside program).
44. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995).
45. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of the intermediate
scrutiny test and its requirement of an important government objective and substantially related
means).
46. 497 U.S. at 600. The case involved a challenge to two policies of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission: "(1) a program awarding enhancement for minority ownership in compara-
tive proceedings for new licenses, and (2) the minority 'distress sale' program, which permitted a
limited number of existing radio and television broadcast stations to be transferred only to mi-
nority-controlled firms." Id. at 552.
47. The Court analogized broadcast diversity to diversity of a student body as seen in Bakke:
"Just as a 'diverse student body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally
permissible goal' on which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated,
... the diversity of views and information on the airwaves serves important First Amendment
values." Id. at 568 (citations omitted); see supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the
compelling state interest of student body diversity in the context of the Bakke case).
48. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 567-68.
49. Id. at 565; see infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's traditional
deference to Congress in the affirmative action context).
50. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602. The composition of the dissent-Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia-is crucial to note at this point. With the
addition of Justice Thomas, the dissent in Metro Broadcasting became the majority in Adarand.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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legislative body created the program.51 Metro Broadcasting was the
Court's final word on affirmative action prior to its Adarand decision.
B. The Evolution of Standards of Review
As the above case history demonstrates, one source of the Court's
divisiveness in the area of affirmative action is disagreement over the
correct standard of review. As a framework for analysis under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court has developed a three-tiered ap-
proach which includes rational basis review, 52 intermediate scrutiny,53
and strict scrutiny. 54
Initially, the Supreme Court reviewed equal protection cases under
the rational basis standard.55 This standard of review grants a large
amount of deference to the ability of the legislature to formulate so-
cial policies which relate to legitimate goals.56 In applying this test,
the Court asks whether a classification has a "rational relationship to
any legitimate government interest. '57
The development of the strict scrutiny standard of review for racial
classifications began in a footnote in United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co. 58 There, Justice Stone recognized that a more exacting judi-
cial examination was necessary if legislation prejudiced "discrete and
51. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent, written by
Justice O'Connor, maintained that had strict scrutiny been invoked, as it properly should have
been, the legislation at issue would not have survived. Id. Justice O'Connor stated: "[tihe inter-
est in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is
simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing
racial classifications." Id. Justice O'Connor also asserted that the narrowly tailored prong of the
test was not satisfied. Id. at 621. The policy was overinclusive in that some members of the
racial group had no interest in advancing the views which the FCC believed were under-
represented. Id. The policy was also underinclusive in that those that did have an interest in
presenting their views were not given a preference. Id. Moreover, race-neutral means were
available to remedy the situation. Id. at 622. For example, the FCC could have required its
"licensees to provide programming that the FCC believe[d] would add to diversity." Id.
52. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis review and its
application).
53. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of intermediate scru-
tiny and its application).
54. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text (describing the standard of strict scrutiny and
its application).
55. JoHNm E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 387 (5th ed., West
1995).
56. Id. at 600.
57. Id. at 606. For a more thorough discussion of the rational basis test, including case law
which demonstrates the courts' application of this test, see id. at 606-20.
58. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). In footnote number four, the Court indicated that "preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
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insular" minorities.5 9 This was due to the fact that this type of legisla-
tion might "curtail the operation of those political processes [which]
ordinarily [were] relied upon to protect minorities. '60
Even though the Court in Carolene Products recognized that two
separate modes of analysis were necessary, the birth of strict scrutiny
did not occur until Korematsu v. United States.61 In Korematsu, the
Court held for the first time that "all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. '62 In
order for the standard of strict scrutiny to apply under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the legislation at issue must have been enacted with a
discriminatory purpose63 against a suspect class. 64 If this prerequisite
is met, the government is faced with the burden of proving that it had
a "compelling" state interest for enacting the legislation and that the
means by which it sought to achieve that interest were "narrowly tai-
lored" to effectuate its goal.65 Despite the application of strict scru-
tiny in Korematsu, the Court upheld as constitutional a military order
which excluded persons of Japanese descent from certain areas.66 The
Court rationalized that the government had a compelling state interest
in maintaining safety in times of war.67
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 508, 514 (1993) (tracing the birth of strict scrutiny from Korematsu).
62. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
63. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that there was a disproportionate
racial impact where African-Americans failed an admissions test for the police force four times
as frequently as Caucasians, but this by itself was not enough to demonstrate a discriminatory
purpose necessary to trigger strict scrutiny).
64. An interesting and definitive comment on the idea of suspect class in the affirmative ac-
tion context is found in Justice Brennan's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of CaL v. Bakke:
Unquestionably, we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts
"fundamental rights" or which contains "suspect classifications" is to be subjected to
"strict scrutiny" and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government pur-
pose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.... But no funda-
mental right is involved here.... Nor do whites as a class have any of the "traditional
indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of polit-
ical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian polit-
ical process."
438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing what the Court may require in order
to meet the "narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny).
66. 323 U.S. at 219.
67. Id. at 223. The Court mentioned that the case hinged upon the fact that the United States
was at war with Japan. Id. If Korematsu had been imprisoned solely because of racial prejudice
then the outcome would have been different. Id.
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Although the legislation in the Korematsu case survived, even today
a governmental interest is rarely compelling enough to pass strict scru-
tiny. This rarity provoked Professor Gerald Gunther to coin the
phrase that strict scrutiny means "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."' 68
Gunther compared this to the rational basis standard of review, which
to him meant "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."'69
In other words, with strict and minimal scrutiny as the only standards
of review, the results of equal protection cases were largely a knee-
jerk reaction. 70 Legislation under the two-tiered approach was either
automatically upheld or automatically invalidated. 71 The problem for
the Court then became how to determine which characteristics war-
ranted the application of the strict scrutiny, as opposed to the rational
basis standard.
In the areas of gender, illegitimate children, and aliens, which hold
some of the characteristics of a suspect class, the Court recognized
that neither strict scrutiny nor the rational basis test would allow the
Court to achieve its desired result.72 Thus, the Court introduced inter-
mediate scrutiny as a third, middle tier in the framework. In Craig v.
Boren,73 a gender discrimination case, the Court held that "classifica-
tions by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 74
68. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreward: In Search of an Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
69. Id.
70. It can be argued that strict scrutiny and rational basis review invoke an almost involuntary
reaction. For strict scrutiny, this is demonstrated by the fact that since the 1944 Korematsu case,
no affirmative action legislation has passed strict scrutiny. But see United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding a court order which mandated the use of numerical promotion pref-
erences for state troopers under the strict scrutiny standard). On the other hand, for an example
of the extremely deferential nature of the rational basis test, see Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Williamson upheld a statute which prevented opticians from
duplicating or replacing frame lenses without a prescription from an opthamologist or optome-
trist under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, using the rational basis test.
Id.
71. See Galotto, supra note 61, at 517-18 (arguing that the strict scrutiny and minimal rational-
ity tests operated as per se rules which came pre-packed with specific results).
72. See Jeffery M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of
Scrutiny, 45 OIHO ST. L.J. 161, 163 (1984). "Intermediate scrutiny allows the Court to take a
neutral stance that favors neither the government nor the party challenging it." Id.
73. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
74. Id. at 197. The Court recently utilized intermediate scrutiny to hold that the exclusion of
women from a Virginia military college violated the Equal Protection Clause. United States v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The Court stated that Virginia did not show the necessary
"exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding women." Id. at 2276. Further, the Court ex-
plained: "the justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation. And, it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talent, capaci-
ties, or preferences of males and females." Id. at 2275.
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Although more lenient than the strict scrutiny standard, intermedi-
ate scrutiny does have some force. For example, in Craig v. Boren, the
Court applied this mid-level scrutiny to strike down legislation that
forbade males under the age of twenty-one from buying non-intoxicat-
ing beer,75 while permitting the sale to females over the age of eight-
een.76 The Court found that the government's goal of traffic safety
was sufficient to meet the "important objective" prong of the test.77
However, the means and the ends did not fit. 78 The Court found that
the link between gender and traffic safety was tenuous because the
statute prohibited only the selling of a certain type of beer to young
men; it did not prohibit them from drinking the beer once they ac-
quired it.79
On the other hand, intermediate scrutiny is by no means an insur-
mountable burden. In Michael M. v. Superior Court,80 the Court up-
held a statute which made men, but not women, liable for sexual
intercourse with a partner under the age of eighteen. The Court held
that preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancy was an important gov-
ernmental objective and that the statute equalized the deterrents on
both sexes.81 Therefore, there was a substantial relation between the
ends and the means.82
In the area of affirmative action, the Court has had difficulty in de-
termining whether the strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny standard
is applicable. For instance, in Croson, the Court held that strict scru-
tiny was appropriate due to the fact that the legislation at issue was
based on race, a suspect class. 83 In contrast, the dissent in Croson and
the majority in Metro Broadcasting asserted that affirmative action, a
benign classification, fits more comfortably under intermediate scru-
tiny.84 As will be seen, the Adarand case provides a resolution to this
debate.
75. The percentage of alcohol in the prohibited beer was 3.2 percent. Craig, 429 U.S. at 192.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 199.
78. Id. at 200-04.
79. Id. at 204.
80. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
81. Id. at 473.
82. Id.
83. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
84. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990), overruled by Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
535 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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C. The Troubled Marriage of the Court and Congress
As discussed above, the Court's divisiveness in the affirmative ac-
tion context can be attributed to disagreement over the correct stan-
dard of review. However, this is not the only factor which aggrieves
the Court. Debate over the appropriate relationship between the
Court and Congress has also contributed to the Court's
fragmentation.
The common law has established that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 85 The
Court stated in Boiling v. Sharpe86 that the federal government has
the same obligation as the state to avoid racial classifications because
"it would be unthinkable... [to] impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government. '87 Even though the Court has mandated that Congress
adhere to the Equal Protection Clause by not discriminating, it has
also recognized that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to
enact remedial measures to enforce it, as seen in the affirmative action
context.88
In Fullilove, the Court articulated its view on the appropriate rela-
tionship between Congress and the Court in matters of affirmative ac-
tion.89 There, Justice Burger asserted that "Congress, not the Courts,
has the heavy burden of dealing with a host of intractable economic
and social problems." 90 Thus, the Court imposed a less-stringent stan-
dard of review on the federally enacted minority set-aside program,
under the theory that "Congress has the necessary latitude to try new
techniques, such as the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria to ac-
complish remedial objectives." 91 This view was further affirmed by
the Court in Metro Broadcasting, where it held that the appropriate
standard of review for federal legislation was intermediate scrutiny.92
The Adarand decision represents a departure from this notion of judi-
cial deference to Congress. In Adarand, the Court, for the first time,
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (com-
menting that the Court's approach to equal protection claims is the same under the Fifth
Amendment as it is under the Fourteenth Amendment).
86. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
87. Id. at 500.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 9 (discussing the origin of congressional authority to
enact remedial measures).
89. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
90. Id. at 486.
91. Id. at 490.
92. 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995).
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applied strict scrutiny to a federally enacted affirmative action
program.93
D. The Perils and Prominence of Precedent
The Court's obligation to abide by, or adhere to, its formerly de-
cided cases94 is the final factor which has plagued the Court in its af-
firmative action jurisprudence. Although the Court rarely mentions
the doctrine of stare decisis explicitly in its decisions, it is of funda-
mental importance. 95
A prime example of stare decisis at work is seen in the abortion
context. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,96 the Court refused to over-
rule the doctrine established in Roe v. Wade.97 Justice O'Connor
stated that "the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for pre-
cedent is, by definition, indispensable. '98 Justice O'Connor main-
tained, however, that stare decisis was not an "inexorable command";
she stated that precedent may be overruled if "the rule has proven to
be intolerable simply in defying practical workability" 99 or if the law
has changed such that the old rule is "no more than a remnant of
abandoned doctrine." 100 Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor determined
that Casey was the inappropriate vehicle for overruling Roe, due to
the fact that those who had relied on Roe might suffer inequity if it
were overruled. 10
Whereas Casey exemplifies the importance of upholding precedent,
Brown v. Board of Education'0 2 presents a strong argument for aban-
doning it. The desegregation of schools mandated by Brown never
93. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
94. Stare decisis has been defined as:
Policy of the courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. Doctrine
that, when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where the facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
95. See James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power that Shall Be Vested in a Precedent. Stare Deci-
sis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986) (arguing that stare
decisis is virtuous in that it promotes "fairness, stability, predictability and efficiency" in the law,
and also ensures that "similarly situated individuals are subject to the same legal
consequences").
96. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 855.
101. Id. at 856.
102. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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would have occurred if the Court was bound to the "separate but
equal" principle of Plessy v. Ferguson.10 3 In other words, a disadvan-
tage of strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis is that it may
shield prior judicial errors from subsequent correction. 1°4
Despite the force of the arguments for and against stare decisis, the
application of the doctrine depends largely on the views of the individ-
ual Justices.' 05 Consequently, the doctrine remains "indeterminate"
and "malleable," depending on the subjective views of the individual
Justices.' 06 As will be explained, the doctrine of stare decisis played
an important role in the Adarand decision. 0 7
II. SUBJECT OPINION: ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, IN. v. PEVA
A. Facts and Procedure
Adarand Constructors, Inc., a Colorado-based highway construc-
tion company run by a Caucasian male, brought suit against the
United States Department of Transportation under the equal protec-
103. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the plaintiff, who was seven-eighths Caucasian and one-
eighth African, was convicted for violating a Louisiana state law which designated "separate
railway carriages for the white and colored races." Id. at 540. The Court held that this practice
was not violative of either the Thirteenth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
552. The Court reasoned that the government has an obligation to provide "equal rights before
the law and equal opportunities." Id. at 551. This obligation was satisfied by providing equal
access to the train system. Id. The government, however, could not force the races to commin-
gle. Id. The Court stated:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based
upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be
equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to
the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same
plane.
Id. at 551-52. This notion was subsequently abolished by the Court in Brown, where the Court
held that "separate educational facilities [we]re inherently unequal" and deprived persons "of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (emphasis added). The Court held that there are certain intangible factors which prevent
a child in a segregated school from receiving equal educational opportunities. Id. at 493-94.
104. Amy L. Padden, Note, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Deci-
sion's Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee,
82 GEO. L.J. 1689, 1693 (1994).
105. See David K. Koehler, Justice Souter's "Keep-What-You-Want-and-Throw-Away-the-Rest"
Interpretation of Stare Decisis, 42 But'. L. REv. 859, 892 (1994) (arguing that Justice Souter has
"defam[ed] the doctrine of stare decisis" by picking and choosing which precedents to follow).
This article also discusses Justice Marshall's dissent in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844
(1991), which asserted his view that the Court owes more to its constitutional precedents. Id. at
891.
106. Id. at 891 n.193.
107. See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's abandonment of
the doctrine of stare decisis in the Adarand case).
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tion component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 08
Despite the fact that it submitted the low bid on a guardrail project,
Adarand was passed up for the job, due to the federal government's
incentives to general contractors for hiring "socially and economically
disadvantaged" subcontractors. 10 9 According to federal regulations,
the Small Business Act (SBA) presumes a subcontractor is "socially
disadvantaged" if he or she is Black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcon-
tinent Asian, or Native American. 110 Adarand challenged this pre-
sumption as discrimination on the basis of race."' Adarand sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the use of this subcontractor
compensation clause." 12
Adarand filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Col-
orado, which granted summary judgment in favor of the govern-
ment.113 Adarand then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. 1 4 The Tenth Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court's
prior affirmative action decisions and determined that intermediate
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. 1 5 The court rea-
soned that because the program at issue was enacted by Congress, a
more lenient standard of review was required under Fullilove.116 The
Tenth Circuit interpreted Croson as holding that strict scrutiny is only
108. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2101 (1995); see infra note 130 (dis-
cussing the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
109. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101. Adarand knew that the federal incentive program was the
reason that it was passed up for the guardrail project. Id. at 2102. The general contractor,
Mountain Gravel & Construction Company, submitted an affidavit stating that Mountain Gravel
would have accepted Adarand's bid, had it not been for the additional payment it received by
hiring the minority firm instead. Id.
110. Id. at 2103 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(b)(1) (1995)).
111. Id. at 2102. The Court highlighted several pertinent sections of the SBA, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 631-651 (1994):
The Small Business Act ... declares it to be "the declared policy of the United States
that small business concerns, [and] small business concerns owned and controlled by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.... shall have the maximum prac-
ticable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal
agency." ... The Act defines "socially disadvantaged individuals" as "those who have
been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as
a member of a group, without regard to their individual qualities." . . . The SBA
presumes that Black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asia, and Native Ameri-
cans are socially disadvantaged. Social disadvantage is not enough to establish eligibil-
ity, however; SBA also requires each 8(a) program participant to prove "economic
disadvantage."
Id. at 2102-03 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 2104.
113. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (1992).
114. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 1543-44.
116. Id. at 1544.
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applicable when the affirmative action program is enacted by the state
or municipality." 7 Thus, the court applied intermediate scrutiny and
found that under the SBA, the government had an important interest
in helping disadvantaged businesses obtain subcontracts. 118 Further,
the program at issue was narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. 1 9 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriate stan-
dard of review. 120
B. The Majority Opinion
In a five-to-four decision,' 2 ' the Supreme Court decided that for
federally enacted affirmative action programs, as well as state and lo-
cal ones, strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. 22 The
Court then remanded the case to the lower court for further analy-
sis.123 Composing the majority in this case were Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.124 Justice
O'Connor wrote the Court's opinion.
After determining that Adarand had standing, 25 the Court re-
viewed its affirmative action decisions prior to Adarand, with the ex-
ception of Metro Broadcasting.126 The Court stated that three general
principles had been established in its jurisprudence regarding govern-
mental racial classifications: "skepticism," "consistency," and
"congruence."1 27
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1547.
119. Id. The court presented further support for the constitutionality of the federal program:
"the program is not limited to members of racial minority groups," the provision is subject to
regular reevaluation by Congress therefore it is "limited in extent and duration," and the provi-
sion allows the general contractor to decide whether or not to award the contract to a minority
business. Id.
120. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2101-02 (1995).
121. This is one of many closely decided affirmative action cases. See, e.g., Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding as constitutional a federally enacted affirmative
action program which allowed for the use of race as a factor in the application for a broadcast
license, in a five-to-four decision), overruled by Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding unconstitutional, in a five-to-four decision, a racially pref-
erential layoff plan).
122. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
123. Id. at 2118.
124. Id. at 2101.
125. Justice O'Connor began by recognizing that Adarand had standing to bring the suit since
Adarand was likely to bid on a guardrail contract which contained a subcontractor compensation
clause in the relatively near future. Id. at 2104-05.
126. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106-13; see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990),
overruled by Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
127. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. Justice O'Connor utilized these three propositions as an
attempt to reconcile the inconsistent decisions of the past by finding a basis of agreement. Id.
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In terms of skepticism, the Court cited several of its previous deci-
sions to support the proposition that the Court has traditionally been
suspicious of any classification based on racial or ethnic criteria.128 In
addition, the Court asserted that it had previously been consistent in
its application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action cases.129 Finally,
the Court observed that there was congruence between the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal pro-
tection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause in
that the analysis under both is the same.' 30 The Court combined these
three ideas to reach the conclusion that "any person, of whatever race,
has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.' 31
The Court was faced with one predominant barrier in justifying this
position: its decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.132 By apply-
ing strict scrutiny to the program at issue, the Court explicitly over-
ruled its decision in Metro Broadcasting, which had applied
intermediate scrutiny to a federally enacted affirmative action pro-
gram. 133 The Court began to surmount this barrier by explaining the
difficulty involved in determining which classifications are "benign"
and which are "illegitimate."'1 34 Strict scrutiny, according to the
128. Id. The Court first cited the plurality opinion of Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Justice Powell stated there that "any preference based on racial or
ethnic criteria must necessarily receive the most searching examination." Wygant, 476 U.S. at
273.
129. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. To illustrate this consistency the Court cited the plurality
opinion in Croson, which stated that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause
is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification." Id.
(quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)). The Court also cited
Bakke for the proposition that "all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal Protection
Clause must be strictly scrutinized." Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289-90 (1978)).
130. Id. The Court addressed the issue of the difference in language between the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Id. at 2105-08. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1, cl. 2. By comparison, the language of the Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V.
The Court resolved that claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and claims brought
under the Fifth Amendment are treated the same, since both clauses protect against discrimina-
tory legislation by either the state or federal government. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107-08.
131. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
132. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; see supra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text (discussing the decision in Metro Broadcasting and its application of interme-
diate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, to federally enacted affirmative action programs).
133. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
134. Id. at 2112 (citations omitted).
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Court, is necessary to "'smoke-out' the illegitimate uses of race."'1 35
The Court also criticized Metro Broadcasting's distinction between
federal and state classifications as inconsistent with precedent. 136
The majority opinion next explained the flexibility of the doctrine
of stare decisis. The Court maintained that "remaining true to an 'in-
trinsically sounder' doctrine established in prior cases can better serve
the values of stare decisis than would following a more recently de-
cided case inconsistent with the decisions that came before it.' 137 The
Court also pointed out that many commentators have criticized Metro
Broadcasting's requirement that a different standard of review apply
to federal, as opposed to state, affirmative action programs.138 The
Court also distinguished its decision in Casey v. Planned
Parenthood,139 where it had adhered to the doctrine of stare decisis.140
The Court reasoned that in Casey, the decision in Roe v. Wade14' was
preserved due to the fact that society had substantially relied on the
ability to obtain an abortion.' 42 The Court opined that since Metro
Broadcasting was a departure from its prior affirmative action cases
and was a relatively recent decision, overruling the case was unlikely
to affect conduct in any way.' 43
The majority was also certain to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny
is "strict in theory, fatal in fact.' 144 In so doing, the Court relied on
the case of United States v. Paradise,145 which held that a race-con-
scious remedy was sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass the strict scru-
tiny test.146 The Court declared that "[w]hen race-based action is
necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within consti-
tutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court
has set out in previous cases."'1 47 The Court then remanded the case
135. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (O'Connor, J.)).
136. Id. at 2117. The Court more explicitly stated: "Metro Broadcasting's untenable distinc-
tion between state and federal racial classifications lacks support in our precedent, and under-
mines the fundamental principle of equal protection as a personal right. In this case, as between
that principle and 'its later misapplications,' the principle must prevail." Id.
137. Id. at 2115.
138. Id. (citations omitted).
139. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
140. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2116.
141. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe held that a woman has a constitutional right to abortion. Id.
142. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2116.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2117.
145. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
146. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117-18.
147. Id.
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to the lower court to determine if the program was narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling interest.1 48
C. The Concurrences
Both Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote concurring opinions. 149 Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion diverged from that of the rest of the majority by
maintaining that strict scrutiny is indeed strict in theory and fatal in
fact. 150 Justice Scalia firmly asserted that "the government can never
have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in
order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direc-
tion. . . . [T]here can be no such thing as a creditor and debtor
race.' 151 As to whether the program at issue could survive strict scru-
tiny, Justice Scalia stated that it would be "unlikely, if not
impossible." 52
Justice Thomas concurred to draw attention to the issues of racial
paternalism and stigma. 5 3 It was his belief that affirmative action
programs "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause
them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are
'entitled' to preferences."'1 54 In Justice Thomas' opinion, there was no
difference between benign discrimination sponsored by the govern-
ment and racial prejudice. 55
D. The Dissents
Four Justices dissented in Adarand: Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer. Each of them wrote an opinion, except for Justice
Breyer. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote the most
detailed dissent, criticizing the majority's three propositions of skepti-
148. Id. at 2118.
149. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 2118.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2119.
153. Id.
154. Id. Perhaps Justice Thomas' decision was based on his own past experience with affirma-
tive action programs. Justice Thomas was accepted at Yale Law School due partly to "an affirm-
ative action plan to recruit qualified minority students." THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPI-ES, 1789-1995, 527-28 (Claire Cushman ed., Congressional Quarterly
1993). Thomas was "troubled" that he was a "beneficiary of such a plan" and later stated "[y]ou
had to prove yourself everyday because the presumption was that you were dumb and didn't
deserve to be there on merit." Id.
155. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119.
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cism, consistency, and congruence. 156 He also criticized the majority's
abandonment of the principle of stare decisis.' 5 7
First, addressing the skepticism issue, Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority that the Court should be "wary of a government decision
that relies upon a racial classification.' 58 However, he did not be-
lieve that a "uniform standard" was appropriate. 59
Second, in regard to consistency, Justice Stevens asserted that "the
consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference be-
tween a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat.' 160 Justice Stevens
believed that the majority needed to recognize the differences be-
tween benign programs, which assist minorities, and invidious ones. 161
To Justice Stevens, the term strict scrutiny "spells the death of any
governmental action" examined under its scope. 162 Although the ma-
jority suggested that strict scrutiny could be defined as less than strict,
Justice Stevens feared that "well-crafted benign programs" would be
in danger.' 63 He criticized the Court's overreliance on rigid standards
of review because "it risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of
formal consistency."'164
Third, Justice Stevens maintained that special deference should be
granted to the institutional competence of Congress. 165 In this re-
spect, he was critical of the majority's congruence rationale. 66 Justice
Stevens believed that the majority failed to recognize the differences
between federal decision makers and local ones. 167 He argued that
"federal affirmative-action programs represent the will of our entire
156. Id. at 2120-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2120-31. Justice Stevens' opinion in Adarand demonstrated that his "experience on
the Court has led [him] to shift from his early stance as an affirmative action skeptic to an
impassioned supporter." Justice Set Aside, NATIoN, July 10, 1995, at 39; see Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448, 547 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the federally enacted minor-
ity set-aside program should be struck down because the ultimate goal must be to eliminate race
from governmental decision making).
158. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2121.
161. Id. at 2120.
162. Id. at 2120-21 n.1.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2122.
165. Id. at 2126.
166. Id. at 2123.
167. Id. Justice Stevens pointed out that several of the Justices in the majority had previously
mentioned the importance of congressional deference in other decisions. Justice Stevens quoted
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Croson: "[Ilt is one thing to permit racially based conduct
by the Federal Government-whose legislative powers concerning matters of race were explic-
itly enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment .... and quite another to permit it by the precise
entities against whose conduct in matters of race that Amendment was specifically directed." Id.
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Nation's elected representatives" and that Congress has been granted
the power, through Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
remedy the effects of past discrimination. 168 Thus, the Court should
treat programs instituted by the federal government differently than
those enacted by the states and municipalities. 169
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority's disregard of the
stare decisis doctrine. 70 He characterized the decision as an "unjusti-
fied departure from settled law.' 71 According to Justice Stevens, it
was "wrong for the Court to suggest.., that overruling Metro Broad-
casting merely restore[d] the status quo ante.' 72 Instead, Justice Ste-
vens would have upheld the program at issue under the Fullilove
standard 73 since the program in Adarand was more tailored than the
one upheld in Fullilove.174 In addition, Justice Stevens commented on
Justice Thomas' theory of "race paternalism."'1 75 To Justice Stevens,
the proposition was extreme. 176 Justice Stevens believed that the ben-
efits of affirmative action outweigh any psychological harm that may
occur.
1 7 7
at 2124 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521-22 (1989)). Justice
Stevens also quoted Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson:
Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate
to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. The power to 'enforce' may at
times also include the power to define situations which Congress determines threaten
principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations.
Id. at 2124-25 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 490).
168. Id. at 2125-26.
169. Id. at 2125.
170. Id. at 2127.
171. Id.
172. Id. Justice Stevens referred to the fact that "Metro Broadcasting involved a federal pro-
gram, whereas Croson involved a city ordinance." Id. Justice Stevens criticized the majority for
rejecting this distinction "in the name of congruence," and further asserted that "the law at the
time of [Metro Broadcasting] was entirely open to the result the Court reached." Id. In other
words, Metro Broadcasting itself was not a departure from settled law. Id.
173. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the standard articulated in Fulli-
love to uphold a federally enacted affirmative action program).
174. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2128.
175. Id. at 2122-23 n.5.
176. Id. Justice Stevens stated: "It is one thing to question the wisdom of affirmative-action
programs .... [Ilt is another thing altogether to equate the many well-meaning and intelligent
lawmakers and their constituents-whether members of majority or minority races-who have
supported affirmative action over the years, to segregationists and bigots." Id.
177. Id. Justice Stevens further articulated:
I am not persuaded that the psychological damage brought on by affirmative action is
as severe as that engendered by racial subordination. That, in any event, is a judgment
the political branches can be trusted to make. In enacting affirmative action programs,
a legislature intends to remove obstacles that have unfairly placed individuals of equal
qualifications at a competitive disadvantage.... I do not believe such action, whether
wise or unwise, deserves such an invidious label as "racial paternalism". If the
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Justice Souter also wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer joined.178 Justice Souter argued that the ques-
tion of the appropriate standard of review should not have been
reached by the Court.179 Rather, the only issue on appeal was
whether, under Croson, an agency needed to make particularized
findings of discrimination. 180 Nevertheless, Justice Souter agreed with
Justice Stevens that the doctrine of stare decisis mandates the applica-
tion of Fullilove.'8' Justice Souter also added that the majority's rec-
ognition that the application of strict scrutiny can result in the survival
of a classification might indicate that equal protection is more elastic
than the categories suggest. 82
Finally, the two most junior members of the Court, Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer, joined together in dissent. Justice Ginsburg began
her dissenting opinion by stating that it was not the place of the Court
to intervene in this matter since Congress was competent to deal with
the issue of affirmative action. 83 Instead of accentuating the differ-
ences between the majority and dissenting opinions, Justice Ginsburg
pointed out that in several respects the individual Justices had all
reached a common ground. 184 Justice Ginsburg asserted that all mem-
bers of the Court agreed that racial discrimination is a persistent real-
ity and that Congress has been granted the authority to end it.185
Justice Ginsburg next discussed the strict scrutiny issue. She charac-
terized the majority's version of strict scrutiny as "fatal for classifica-
tions burdening groups that have suffered discrimination in our
society.' 86 However, Justice Ginsburg also noted that for affirmative
action classifications, the standard is not fatal in fact.' 87 Justice Gins-
burg articulated that this type of scrutiny is beneficial because it dif-
ferentiates between "classifications [which are] in reality malign, but
legislature is persuaded that its program is doing more harm than good to the individu-
als it is designed to benefit, then we can expect the legislature to remedy the problem.
Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2132. But cf. Koehler, supra note 105, at 883 (arguing that in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 502 U.S. 1056 (1992), Justice Souter defamed the idea of stare decisis by "resort[ing] to
the neutral rhetoric of stare decisis to disguise his own value judgments and acknowledgment of
social pressure").
182. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132.
183. Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2135.
186. Id. at 2136.
187. Id.
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masquerading as benign."'188 Justice Ginsburg concluded that she
would uphold the program at issue, but recognized that improvement
in the area of affirmative action may be necessary.189 According to
Justice Ginsburg, however, this would be a task for the political
branches. 190
III. ANALYSIS
Prior to the Adarand decision, the law of affirmative action was
clearly in a state of unrest. Although the Adarand Court managed to
reach a consensus, the battle between colorblindness and remedial
measures was still evident in the opinions of the various Justices. 191 In
fact, the ideologies of the individual Justices played an important role
in the Court's mistreatment of three important issues:19'2 the appro-
priate standard of review for affirmative action, 93 the boundaries of
the relationship between Congress and the Court, 94 and the role of
stare decisis. 195 The following analysis focuses on these three issues in
order to demonstrate that the Adarand decision is in error.
In the next subsection, the author illustrates the illogical result of
the Court's application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action pro-
grams. As the author explains, if strict scrutiny is defined as fatal in
188. Id. at 2134.
189. Id. at 2136.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 124-90 and accompanying text (discussing the individual views of the
Justices in the Adarand decision).
192. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the dissent in Metro Broadcasting quickly
became the majority in Adarand with the addition of Justice Thomas. See Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602-03 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating the dissenters'-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia-view that strict scrutiny
was the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications). Since Metro Broadcasting, the
composition of the Court had changed. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and White de-
parted from the Court. They were replaced by Justices Thomas, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
From the time of his nomination, it was accurately predicted that Justice Thomas would be
opposed to affirmative action measures. Ted Gest, Thomas's Bias Cases, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Nov. 7, 1994, at 63. "His views on affirmative action were shaped ... by his grandfather
who taught him that hard work and discipline were the ways to overcome discrimination." Id.
Justice Thomas' view, and that of other conservatives, is that remedies should be limited to
individuals who can prove that they were directly victimized by bigotry. Id.
By contrast, two other recently appointed Justices had supported affirmative action programs
in the past. As Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Justice Breyer
upheld affirmative action programs. Kenneth A. Martin, Is This the End of Federal Minority
Contracting, 42 FED. LAW. 44, 47 (Feb., 1995) (citing Stuart v. Roche, 951 U.S. 446 (1st Cir.
1991)). Similarly, as an appellate court judge, Justice Ginsburg also voted in favor of federally
enacted affirmative action programs. Id. (citing Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
193. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
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fact, Adarand will result in the abolition of remedial measures which
have long promoted the goal of equality. On the other hand, if strict
scrutiny is not fatal to the racial classification at issue, minorities will
no longer be able to rely on strict scrutiny as a shield from invidious
discrimination. To add to these definitional problems, the author
posits that a new standard of review has been introduced in Adarand.
This standard would fall between strict and intermediate scrutiny.
The author evaluates this new standard alongside of other alternatives
proposed by various legal commentators.
In the following two subsections, the author briefly discusses the
ramifications that the application of strict scrutiny will have on the
relationship between Congress and the Court and the doctrine of stare
decisis. Finally, the author proposes that the application of intermedi-
ate scrutiny would have circumvented these three problems.
A. Strict Scrutiny: The Search for a Definition
The Court's application of strict scrutiny to federally enacted af-
firmative action programs is problematic. In the interest of operating
in a strictly colorblind fashion, the Court failed to recognize the prag-
matic ramifications of its decision. In particular, the Court erred when
it failed to provide a clear definition of the term "strict scrutiny.'' 196 Is
strict scrutiny still fatal in fact? Or, has the Court created a new, more
lenient definition of strict scrutiny? Instead of providing a consistent
rule to govern affirmative action, the Court in Adarand left more
questions than it answered. The author proposes that the Court could
have eliminated these problems by applying the intermediate scrutiny
standard of review.
1. Is Strict Scrutiny Still Fatal in Fact?
If the fatal in fact standard is applied to benign affirmative action
programs, the result is inconsistent with the goal of equality. In tradi-
tional Equal Protection jurisprudence, the role of strict scrutiny has
been that of protector. 197 It has sheltered minorities from invidious
discrimination by striking down virtually all legislation which classifies
on the basis of race.' 98 However, when this same strict scrutiny is ap-
196. Justice O'Connor was certain to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny meant "strict in
theory, fatal in fact." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995). On the
other hand, Justice Scalia explicitly stated that it would be "impossible" for the program at issue
to meet the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing examples of where the Court has
utilized the Equal Protection Clause to protect individuals from discrimination).
198. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (arguing that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory and fatal in fact").
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plied to remedial affirmative action measures the results are incongru-
ous. 199 Legislatures are paralyzed from enacting programs that
remedy race discrimination, yet they still have the ability to enact pro-
grams that remedy gender discrimination which are reviewed under
intermediate scrutiny.200 This occurs despite the fact that the purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause was to end racial discrimination.20 1
The majority, however, either did not recognize this problem or chose
to ignore it.
Despite the fallacies inherent in the application of strict scrutiny,
there are persuasive arguments for eliminating affirmative action.202
199. This problem is best characterized by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. City of Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D.
Pa. 1990). The court stated:
In the non-affirmative action context the use of a three-tiered analysis for ordinances
disadvantaging blacks, women or non-suspect classifications creates the result intended
by the Supreme Court-it is most difficult to uphold a classification disadvantaging
blacks, less difficult to uphold a classification disadvantaging women, and easiest to
uphold a classification disadvantaging a non-suspect class. However, in the affirmative
action setting the use of a three-tiered scheme means that laws disadvantaging whites
... will be held to a stricter standard than laws disadvantaging men .... The flip-side of
this is that under the sliding scale analysis, it becomes easier for a state legislature or a
city council to pass [a female-owned business enterprise program than a minority
owned business enterprise program] .. .because the former will be held to a lesser
standard of scrutiny by the courts.
Id. at 1302.
200. See Holly Dyer, Gender-Based Affirmative Action: Where Does It Fit in the Tiered
Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 591, 600 (1993) (presenting the same
problem and making the argument that a gender-based program is more likely to be upheld even
though the court views gender discrimination as less invidious than race discrimination).
201. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[Tloday's lecture about 'consis-
tency' will produce the anomalous result that the Government can more easily enact affirmative-
action programs to remedy discrimination against women than it can enact affirmative-action
programs to remedy discrimination against African Americans-even though the primary pur-
pose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the former slaves.' Id. at
2122.
202. See, e.g., John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit. An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IowA L. REv. 313, 314 (1994). The author lists several
arguments against affirmative action:
Affirmative action is not colorblind, because it intentionally invokes racial
classifications.
Affirmative action is not based on individuals, but on groups.
Affirmative action is not based on merit.
Affirmative action leads to racial politics and backlash in the form of white extremists.
Affirmative action is exploited by middle-class African-Americans.
Affirmative action stigmatizes its intended "beneficiaries".
Affirmative action is social engineering, demanding equal results rather than equal
opportunity.
Affirmative action victimizes innocent (white) workers.
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At first blush, the Court's decision in Adarand may seem desirable.
This negative view of affirmative action is reflected in the concur-
rences of Justices Scalia and Thomas.
The concurring opinion of Justice Scalia2Q3 reflects the sentiments of
those individuals who support the annihilation of affirmative action
programs. Justice Scalia took the strict interpretivist view that the
Constitution prohibits discrimination against any race. Justice Scalia
also argued that one race should not have to now incur a debt, i.e.,
discriminatory treatment, to "make up" for the discriminatory prac-
tices of the past.2°4 He asserted:
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most ad-
mirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for
future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race
privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of the government we are just
one race here. It is American.2 05
Thus, Justice Scalia remained true to the position that he articulated in
Croson-that racial preferences should not be used to "even the
score" between African-Americans and Caucasians.206 To do so only
furthers the notion that it is appropriate for our society to be divided
into races.20 7
Similarly, Justice Thomas was concerned that affirmative action
programs would stigmatize minorities and promote the idea of race-
paternalism.208 This argument is persuasive because it indicates that
affirmative action militates against the idea of individualism, which
the Equal Protection Clause is supposed to protect and, instead, fo-
cuses on the inferiority of minority groups.20 9 In support of Thomas,
it can also be said that the mere fact that the Court or Congress
203. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19.
204. Id. at 2118; see supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (discussing the concurring
opinion of Justice Scalia and his rejection of the notion that there is a "debtor" and a "creditor"
race).
205. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119.
206. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119. There are counter-arguments which can be made to Justice
Thomas' idea of stigma. See Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 55
OIo ST. L.J. 79, 93 (1994) (arguing that there is symbolic value in increased minority participa-
tion in businesses and in positions of respect and authority, although there is the potential for
stigma).
209. See Morrison, supra note 202, at 342-43 (discussing the arguments of stigma and individu-
ality). The stigma argument was also recently addressed in the case of Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Hopwood
opinion and its interpretation of the Adarand decision). In Hopwood, the court recognized that
the stigma argument can be traced back to Brown v. Board of Education where the Supreme
Court held that "classification on the basis of race 'generates a feeling of inferiority."' Hop-
wood, 78 F.3d at 947 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). The Hopwood
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chooses to focus on differences poses the risk of recreating differences
and reinforcing stereotypes. 210
The underlying theme of both the majority opinion and Justice
Thomas' concurrence is the idea that colorblindness is beneficial to
African-Americans. Indeed, colorblindness would be ideal were it not
for the past history and present reality of racial discrimination. As
one legal scholar explains, colorblindness has been mythologized by
many Americans as a moral means for achieving racial justice, when,
indeed, colorblindness merely maintains the status quo.211 There are
additional down sides to colorblindness as well. For example, color-
blindness ignores ethnic backgrounds and fails to recognize that
ethnicity is an important part of individual identity.212
Although the arguments for colorblindness are forceful, they are
not strong enough to support the elimination of affirmative action
court also cited the language of one renowned constitutional law scholar to support the argu-
ment that government-enacted affirmative action plans stigmatize minorities:
The message from government is written very large when these plans proliferate: a
double (and softer) standard for admission .... a double (and softer) standard for
promotion, a double (and softer) standard for competitive bidding, and so on. Without
question, this is a systematic racial tagging by government-a communication to others
that the race of the individual they deal with bespeaks a race-related probability, cre-
ated solely by the government itself, of lesser qualification than others holding
equivalent positions.
Id. at 947 n.34 (citing William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. Cn. L. REV. 775, 787 n.38 (1979)).
210. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Foreward, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 10, 12 (1986).
211. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy
Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994). Professor Culp also
explains that the Constitution itself is ineptly colorblind if the history surrounding the enactment
of the Constitution is examined:
The white men who adopted the Constitution refused to put the words "race," "color,"
or "slavery" anywhere in its text. The Constitution was thus formally "neutral" toward
race, slavery, and color. This conscious decision to be colorblind, of course, did not
prevent the creators of the American constitutional order from accepting the perni-
cious American form of slavery. The Constitution was, in modern constitutional par-
lance, facially neutral while protecting racial subjugation by private parties and even
governmental entities.
Id. at 171. In other words, colorblindness sustains the social arrangements that presently exist
and, in doing so, assumes that discrimination has been completely obliterated. Id.
212. Clarence Page, The Rudeness of Race, Cn. TRIn., Feb. 11, 1996, § 10, at 12-13. The
author provides an African-American viewpoint on colorblindness:
I would argue that too much has been made of the virtue of "colorblindness." I don't
want Americans to be blind to my color as long as color continues to make a profound
difference in determining life chances and opportunities. Nor do I wish to see so signif-
icant a part of my identity denied.... Today I live a well-integrated life in the suburbs.
Black folks still tell me how to be "black" when I stray from the racial party lines, while
white folks tell me how to be "colorblind."
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through the vehicle of a strict scrutiny. On balance, Justice Stevens
stated that he did not believe that "the psychological damage brought
on by affirmative action is as severe as that engendered by racial sub-
ordination. 213 Even today, racial subordination remains pervasive.214
It is a societal ailment that necessitates treatment, not avoidance.
Race-conscious remedies are the only means by which racial discrimi-
nation can be eliminated.215
2. The Birth of a New Standard of Review?
The indication by the majority that strict scrutiny may not be fatal
in fact also produces untenable results. The majority articulated that
it is indeed feasible that affirmative action legislation could pass the
strict scrutiny test.216 However, in the non-affirmative action context,
a definition of strict scrutiny that is less than strict may not protect
minorities from impermissible uses of race as it was originally in-
tended to do.217
The Court's indication that strict scrutiny is something less than
strict is a radical departure from prior case law.218 Since Kore-
matsu,219 the Court has generally refused to allow a classification to
pass the strict scrutiny test. To suddenly allow a classification to pass
strict scrutiny, as proposed in Adarand, would significantly water
down the meaning of the term. Justice Souter alluded to this point in
his dissent when he stated that "the Court's very recognition ... that
strict scrutiny can be compatible with the survival of a classification so
reviewed demonstrates that our concepts of equal protection enjoy a
greater elasticity than the standard categories might suggest. '220
213. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Page, supra note 212, at 13. The author explains that in 1865, as newly freed slaves,
African-Americans controlled three percent of the wealth in America. Today, African-Ameri-
cans still only control three percent of the wealth in America. Id.
215. The opinion of Justice Blackmun in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), is illuminating here. Justice Blackmun stated: "In order to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we
must treat them differently." Id. at 407.
216. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
217. For example, what would be the result of a case like Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967),
if the term strict scrutiny were viewed as less then strict? See supra note 8 and accompanying
text (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause has served to protect individuals from discrimi-
nation and citing the Loving case as an example).
218. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text (discussing the application of.the strict
scrutiny test).
219. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, where the government
made a racially based classification which excluded Japanese Americans from certain military
areas which encompassed their homes, the Supreme Court upheld the classification under strict
scrutiny. Id.
220. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Alternatively, Justice O'Connor's opinion could be interpreted as
creating an entirely new standard of review, rather than just a water-
ing down of the strict scrutiny standard. This new tier would appar-
ently fall between the traditional fatal in fact strict scrutiny and
intermediate scrutiny.221
If Justice O'Connor did indeed create a new standard of review in
Adarand, the question then becomes: what does this new standard
require? Justice O'Connor stated in the majority opinion that the nar-
rowly tailored prong of the test would still need to be met.222 How-
ever, even with a more lenient standard in place, it is unlikely that any
government program would be sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass
the test.223 This is due to the fact that federal affirmative action pro-
grams are directed at the entire nation, while the discrimination that
these programs redress may differ from locality to locality.224 Addi-
tionally, Justice O'Connor's opinion provides no insight as to whether
this new standard of review would be strictly confined to the affirma-
tive action context. In order for this new standard of review to oper-
ate effectively in practice, these questions must first be addressed by
the Court.
Consequently, the decision in Adarand left the lower courts to con-
tend with the problem of interpretation and, thus, presents a dilemma.
If the lower courts determine that the program at issue does not with-
stand strict scrutiny, this could signal the death of affirmative action
programs. On the other hand, if the program does withstand strict
scrutiny, then the meaning of the term may either be watered down225
or the traditional understanding of the standards of review may be
significantly altered with the addition of a new level of scrutiny.
3. Alternatives to Strict Scrutiny
The Court could have avoided these definitional problems entirely
had it decided this case in a different manner. First, as seen in Metro
Broadcasting, intermediate scrutiny seems to better serve the needs of
affirmative action programs. Intermediate scrutiny allows the govern-
221. See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text (defining the relationship between strict
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny).
222. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
223. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of the narrowly
tailored prong of strict scrutiny in the affirmative action context).
224. See Marcia Coyle, Is a Kinder and Gentler Strict Scrutiny in the Cards?, NAT'L. L.J., June
26, 1995, at A16 (discussing the difficulties with requiring federal affirmative action programs to
be narrowly tailored).
225. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of a lenient
definition of strict scrutiny).
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ment some leeway in crafting programs, but still subjects those pro-
grams to a standard of review that has some bite.2 26
A second alternative would be to take affirmative action out of the
tiers of scrutiny entirely and, instead, utilize the test proposed by Jus-
tice Stevens in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.22 7 This
test would require a court to ask several questions to determine if a
program is constitutional: "(1) What class is benefitted from the mea-
sure? (2) Has it been subjected to invidious past discrimination? (3)
What is the characteristic of the class that justifies extraordinary treat-
ment? (4) What is the public purpose being served by the mea-
sure?"22 8 The advantage of this test is that it is not as rigid as the
traditional test and allows for "both individual and group treatment
theories [to] play a role. z229
Third, Professor Shaman recommended the use of the unified stan-
dard in equal protection cases which would combine the three current
levels of scrutiny into one formula.230 According to that standard, the
inquiry in all instances would be "whether there is an appropriate gov-
ernment interest suitably furthered by the governmental action in
question."12 31 This approach would allow more flexibility for the
Court in that it would not be forced to find a level of review that fits
each circumstance and it could instead focus on the merits of each
case.232 However, because this approach evaluates the totality of the
circumstances, it may not provide lower courts with the guidance that
is needed in equal protection cases. Thus, intermediate scrutiny ap-
pears to be the most viable alternative. 233
226. See Dyer, supra note 200, at 611 (proposing that intermediate scrutiny would be the ap-
propriate standard of review for affirmative action, in that benign classifications can be consid-
ered quasi-suspect); see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing the bite of
intermediate scrutiny).
227. 473 U.S. 432, 452-53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
228. Dyer, supra note 200, at 612-13. Dyer based her test on that created by Justice Stevens in
his concurring opinion in City of Cleburne. Id. (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 453 (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
229. Id. at 612.
230. Shaman, supra note 72, at 177.
231. Id. (quoting Chicago Police Dept. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
232. Id. Professor Shaman also noted that the unified standard might "reduce the harshness
of strict scrutiny" due to the fact that even legislation which is directed at a suspect class would
be upheld if it "suitably furthers an appropriate governmental purpose." Id. at 181.
233. Aside from these tests, there is also an argument that the entire focus of affirmative
action should be redefined. This proposal would use poverty as grounds for special considera-
tion in hiring, rather than race or gender. See Justice Set Aside, supra note 157, at 39. In support
of this proposal, it can be argued that the right of equal protection in itself is concerned with
class. However, it is unlikely that a view of this type would gain popular support with civil rights
defenders. Id.
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B. The Court and Congress: Allies or Adversaries?
The Court's application of strict scrutiny to congressional decision
making shows a fundamental distrust of the legislature. As mentioned
above, this decision may paralyze Congress such that no affirmative
action legislation will be able to pass judicial scrutiny. The Court's
decision ignores the fact that Congress is a direct representative of the
people and has been given the authority to enact equal protection leg-
islation through the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.234 In
Adarand, the Court clearly overstepped the boundaries of its relation-
ship with Congress, demonstrating a disregard for the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers.
Interestingly, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the majority's distrust
of the legislature in Adarand is a radical departure from prior deci-
sions.235 Justice Stevens asserted that the differences between a deci-
sion by Congress and a decision by a state or municipality have been
repeatedly recognized by the same members of the Court who disre-
garded this distinction in Adarand.236 For instance, Justice Scalia's
opinion in Croson pinpointed the reason for the distinction between
federal and local governments: "... . racial discrimination against any
group finds a more ready expression at the state and local level than at
the federal level. '237 The Adarand decision, however, goes against
this notion and refuses to grant to Congress the deference that it has
traditionally been accorded.
Another argument for deference to Congress is that the group dis-
criminated against in Adarand, and in affirmative action legislation
generally, is the majority, Caucasian males. As Professor Robert C.
Power explained, "[i]f a decisionmaker disadvantages itself (or a
group to which a majority of the lawmakers belong), there is no rea-
234. Congress is granted this power through section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which reads, "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
235. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2123 (1995).
236. Id.
237. 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989). In support of this proposition, Justice Scalia cited to the words
of James Madison in THE FEDERALIST No. 10:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; the smaller the number of individuals composing a
majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will
they concert and execute their plan of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength and to act in unison with each other.
Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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son to distrust the process and deferential review would be appropri-
ate. '2 38 He further commented that the idea is that decision makers
"would not act against their own interests" were it not for a good rea-
son.239 In other words, the application of strict scrutiny would not be
necessary, since the majority has the ability to protect its interests
through the political process and does not need the aid of strict scru-
tiny as do minorities.
The refusal of the Court to defer to Congress also speaks volumes
about the Court's view of its own role. Indeed, this judicial distrust of
the legislature can be asserted as the reason why affirmative action is
so controversial.240 As one commentator has pointed out, the
Adarand decision has deprived the American public of the opportu-
nity to be heard on the issue of affirmative action. 241 It is Congress,
the direct representative of the people, who should decide the fate of
affirmative action.242
In this regard, Justice Ginsburg correctly argued that it is not the
place of the Court to decide the future of affirmative action.243 It is
Congress, not the Court, that has the resources and ability to examine
the feasibility of these types of programs. Nevertheless, the majority
chose to make the courts, not Congress, the "day-to-day arbiter of
racial equality in the workplace. '244 These problems point to the need
for a more lenient standard of review for affirmative action.
C. Stare Decisis: To Be or Not to Be?
The Adarand case exemplifies the notion that the application of the
doctrine of stare decisis depends upon the ideology of the individual
Justices. 245 The concept of stare decisis puts an implicit constraint on
each Justice every time a decision is rendered. 246 However, when the
238. Power, supra note 208, at 100-01.
239. Id. at 101 n.53.
240. The End of Affirmative Action, NEw REPUBLIC, July 3, 1995, at 7.
241. Id.
242. Id. As this commentator further explained: "If federal racial preferences are ended-
and we think they should be ended-this historical decision should be announced not by Sandra
Day O'Connor but by the Congress of the United States." Id.
243. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2136 (1995).
244. Justice Set Aside, supra note 157, at 39.
245. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing the idea that adherence to the
Court's precedent depends largely upon the individual members of the Court).
246. Padden, supra note 104, at 1693. This commentator explained:
Because precedent constrains the current Justices, each Justice will try to avoid prece-
dent with which she disagrees. When a Justice does adhere to stare decisis, however,
she must make a decision that may be less than optimal with regard to the particular
facts of the case before her in order to adhere to the precedent. Even if no precedent
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Court in Adarand embraced strict scrutiny, it ignored the doctrine of
stare decisis.247
The Justices' arguments for the abandonment of stare decisis have
little persuasive value. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy,
provided support for the Court's departure from established prece-
dent by indicating that commentators have criticized Metro Broadcast-
ing as unworkable. 248 This argument is difficult to accept. It is
unlikely that the Court succumbed so easily to public opinion. As fur-
ther support, Justice O'Connor also stated that, in contrast to the situ-
ation in Casey, there was no fear that overruling the decision would
harm members of society who have relied upon it.249
Only Justices O'Connor and Kennedy bothered to explain their ra-
tionale for departing from precedent.250 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Jus-
tice Scalia, and Justice Thomas failed to provide any support for their
departure. 251 As one commentator has argued, both Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, however, have developed a relatively
new approach to the doctrine of stare decisis.252 This approach, seem-
ingly at work in Adarand, reduces the precedential value of five-to-
four decisions as well as those decisions that were recently decided.
253
Since Metro Broadcasting was a five-to-four decision, applying the
Rehnquist-Scalia view espoused by this same commentator, this deci-
sion should not carry as much weight.254 In addition, the rationale for
overruling recent decisions may be that the Court can correct an error
in decision making before there is any reliance on it.255
Nevertheless, the decision to overrule Metro Broadcasting appears
to be more of an ideological change, due to the changing composition
of the Court, rather than an intentional abandonment of the doctrine
of stare decisis. This, however, is also undesirable. As the above com-
mentator has stated, "making stare decisis a function of Court politics
exists, the concept of stare decisis still constrains a deciding Justice because she will
realize that she is creating a precedent for future decisionmakers.
Id.
247. The majority explicitly overruled the decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990), which held that federally enacted affirmative action programs are to be re-
viewed under the intermediate scrutiny standard. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
248. Id. at 2115.
249. Id. at 2116; see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's refusal
to overrule Roe v. Wade due to society's reliance on it).
250. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. Id.
252. Padden, supra note 104, at 1689.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1718.
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would leave it without any independent force ... [and] stare decisis
would indeed be a truism: a precedent would deserve continuing sup-
port when it has continuing support from the current members of the
Court. 12 56 Instead, the Court should strive to place more value on its
precedents in the interest of forming sound, coherent doctrines and
developing a more principled basis for deciding cases.
D. Affirmative Action's Savior: Intermediate Scrutiny
As the above discussion indicates, strict scrutiny is the root of the
Court's problems in Adarand. In evaluating the various alternatives
proposed by the commentators, it appears that it would have been
more feasible, and desirable, for the Court to apply intermediate scru-
tiny to federally enacted affirmative action programs. Thus, the Court
would have remained true to the Metro Broadcasting decision. This
would have eliminated the necessity for a new definition of strict scru-
tiny and would allow familiar standards of review to remain intact. It
would also allow Congress the necessary latitude to create affirmative
action programs. It could be argued that, in practice, Justice
O'Connor's version of strict scrutiny may lead to the exact same re-
sults as intermediate scrutiny. The retention of the narrowly tailored
prong of strict scrutiny, however, indicates that the distinction be-
tween the new level of review and intermediate scrutiny is more than
just semantic. As a result, many federally created affirmative action
programs will be unnecessarily eliminated or put at risk.
Nevertheless, even if the lower courts interpret Adarand as com-
manding the elimination of affirmative action programs, it can be ar-
gued that this still does not mean the death of affirmative action.
Businesses, even without the mandate of specific quotas, will still at-
tempt to integrate the policies of affirmative action into their hiring
practices for the simple reason that in an ethnically diverse society this
makes economic sense.257 Although there is some solace in this idea,
256. Id. at 1712. Ibis commentator added:
Even though recent cases are not immune to being overruled, the change of one Jus-
tice's vote in a short period of time is not in itself sufficient reason to abandon a prece-
dent .... [A] reversal fueled by a mere change in the Court's personnel is particularly
damaging to the Court's image as a neutral decisionmaker.... [B]ecause it is a Consti-
tution that the Court is expounding, a mere change in the expounders should not lead
to rapid fluctuations in interpretations.
Id. at 1719.
257. James P. Pinkerton, Why Affirmative Action Won't Die: Republicans, The Courts and
California Have Declared War on It. But Racial Preference Policies Have Two Things Going for
Them: Economic Logic-and Lawyers, FORTUNE, Nov. 13, 1995, at 192; see also Power, supra
note 208, at 93 (arguing that symbolism plays a role in the affirmative action context and that
there is "symbolic value of increased minority participation in businesses").
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for minorities who still suffer from the effects of racial discrimination,
this may not be enough. As the next section illustrates, the impact of
the Adarand decision will be harsh.
IV. IMPACT
A. The Strict Scrutiny Dilemma
In the aftermath of Adarand, as discussed above, lower courts will
be faced with a dilemma. They have the choice of applying the tradi-
tional "fatal in fact" version of strict scrutiny or the newly developed
standard of review which seems to be less then strict. Regardless of
which they choose, the outcome will be the same: the end of affirma-
tive action as we know it. Even if some affirmative action programs
are upheld under the new standard of review, many will undoubtedly
be eliminated. Moreover, the legislature may be chilled from enacting
any new affirmative action legislation.
The dilemma described above has already been confronted by sev-
eral courts. For example, in Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Edu-
cation,258 the Middle District of Alabama upheld a consent decree
requiring race-conscious promotion and hiring practices in a school
district using strict scrutiny. The court reasoned that the hiring prac-
tices were sufficiently narrowly tailored259 to meet the compelling in-
terest of remedying past discrimination. 260
Similarly, in Alexander v. Prince George's County, Maryland,261 ap-
plicants for firefighter positions challenged the County's affirmative
action hiring plan. The United States District Court applied strict
scrutiny, citing Adarand, and upheld the plan.262 The court indicated
that the plan was narrowly tailored since there were no alternative
remedies available, the plan was limited in duration, and the plan did
not require the department to hire a certain number of minorities. 263
In addition, the court considered the impact of the plan on innocent
third parties.26"
258. 897 F. Supp. 1535 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
259. The court looked at four factors to determine if the program was narrowly tailored: "the
necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternate remedies; the flexibility and duration of the
relief... ; the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of
the relief on the rights of third parties." Id. at 1568-69 (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 171 (1987)).
260. Id. at 1568-70.
261. 901 F. Supp. 986 (D. Md. 1995).
262. Id. at 992-95.
263. Id. at 995.
264. Id. at 996.
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Although the above-mentioned cases illustrate that affirmative ac-
tion programs can withstand strict scrutiny, another court has decided
otherwise. Under facts similar to Adarand, the court in Cornelius v.
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority265 held
that a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could not
pass strict scrutiny.266 The transit authority did not identify a pattern
of discrimination and, thus, failed to justify the imposition of prefer-
ences to minorities. 267 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood v.
Texas, recently held that a law school could not use race as a factor for
determining admissions and that racial diversity was not a sufficiently
compelling interest to meet the strict scrutiny test.2 68 As to the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny, the court cited Adarand and stated that "there
is now absolutely no doubt that courts are to employ strict scrutiny
when evaluating all racial classifications, including those characterized
by their proponents as 'benign' or 'remedial.' 269
The incongruous results reached by the above-mentioned courts
demonstrate a key problem with the Adarand decision: it fails to pro-
vide any guidance to the lower courts. Instead of clarifying the law of
affirmative action through Adarand, the Court has instead muddled it
further. Thus, the future of affirmative action jurisprudence is left un-
determined, much like it was prior to the Adarand decision.270
B. Redefining a Relationship
The lower courts are not the only body left to contend with the
Adarand decision. Both the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government have addressed the issue of the future of affirma-
tive action after Adarand.
The affirmative action program at issue in Adarand is one of 160
affirmative action programs created by Congress. 271 These programs
direct approximately $10 billion to minority firms every year.27 2 With
Croson as a guide, Congress is currently evaluating these programs to
265. No. BC 101913, 1995 WL 499822, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 27, 1995).
266. Id. at *3.
267. Id.
268. 78 F.3d 932, 962 (1996).
269. Id. at 940. However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Wiener disagreed with this inter-
pretation of the Adarand decision: "Justice O'Connor expressly states that Adarand is not the
death knell of affirmative action-to which I would add, especially not in the framework of
achieving diversity in public graduate schools." Id. at 963-64.
270. See supra notes 20-51 and accompanying text (tracing the Court's affirmative action juris-
prudence from Bakke through Metro Broadcasting).
271. Charles Oliver, Is Affirmative Action In or Out? Supreme Court Ruling Will Take Years
to Sort Out, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, June 28, 1995, at Al.
272. Id.
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determine if they meet strict scrutiny.273 In addition, President Clin-
ton has directed that any affirmative action program must be elimi-
nated or reformed if the program meets the following conditions: (1)
it creates a quota; (2) it creates preference for unqualified individuals;
(3) it creates reverse discrimination; or (4) it continues after its equal
opportunity purposes have been achieved.274
The effect of the Adarand decision on these programs may be pre-
dicted by evaluating the results of Croson. In Croson, the Court ap-
plied strict scrutiny to state and local affirmative action programs.275
Within a year of Croson, nearly all state and local minority set-aside
programs had come to an end.276 However, many of these programs
were later restored when states and localities paid for studies to ex-
plicitly demonstrate that wrongs had occurred.277 Nevertheless, when
the minority set-asides ended pursuant to Croson, the minority share
of construction dollars dropped from approximately forty percent to
two percent. 278 This situation demonstrates the need for remedial af-
firmative action programs. If the post-Croson situation is an accurate
predictor, the Adarand decision may severely injure those minorities
that the Court intended to protect.
Aside from injuring minorities, the Adarand decision will also dam-
age the relationship between Congress and the Court. As one court in
a post-Adarand decision has recently commented:
There is value in a democracy in permitting the people, directly and
through their representatives, to wrestle with these hard issues,
which are manifestations of enduring, historical dilemmas ....
[P]erhaps this country is finally ready to embrace the ideal that we
273. Re: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
the Constitution, 104th Cong. (September 22, 1995) (statement of Associate Attorney General
John R. Schmidt), available in Fed. News Serv.-Cong. Hearing Testimonies 1995 WL 10388398.
The Associate Attorney General stated that there are six questions to be used as the basis for
evaluation of affirmative action programs:
(1) [T]he manner in which race is used in the programs (e.g., as an exclusive factor or
one among many), (2) whether non-racial alternatives are or have been considered, (3)
whether the program permits waiver of race as a factor in decisionmaking, (4) the man-
ner in which any numerical goal was calculated, (5) whether there is a continuing need
for the program or whether it has outlived its justification, and (6) the burden that is
imposed on non-beneficiaries of the program.
Id.
274. President's Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the
Evaluation of Affirmative Action Programs, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1264 (July 17, 1995).
275. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Croson decision to apply
strict scrutiny to state and local affirmative action programs).




will operate legally as a color blind society. However, if unelected
judges unnecessarily short-circuit the political debate, we may never
know for sure.279
The Court's limitation of the authority of Congress has been a trend
of the Court during the 1994-1995 term. The Court appears to have
set new parameters for its future relationship with Congress. In addi-
tion to Adarand, the Court also limited the powers of Congress in
United States v. Lopez.280 In Lopez, the Court held that Congress had
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which prohibited the possession of a gun
within 1,000 feet of a school.28' Through cases such as Adarand and
Lopez, the Court has redefined its role in the political arena, while
limiting the role of Congress.
C. The Future of Past Precedent
The Court's view of stare decisis in Adarand will also have an im-
pact on the lower court's treatment of precedent. The decision seems
to advise the lower courts to look to the ideologies of the Supreme
Court Justices to determine whether or not they should follow prece-
dent.282 This is not desirable. Moreover, it may lead to inconsistent
results. In addition, the lower courts may become "less mindful" in
following recent five-to-four decisions since there is the increased
awareness that those decisions are more susceptible to reversal. 283
V. CONCLUSION
The Adarand case is clearly the armageddon of affirmative action.
The Supreme Court's application of strict scrutiny to federally enacted
affirmative action programs has resulted in the death of affirmative
action as we know it. Although some remnants of affirmative action
may remain, ultimately, the Court's decision will be detrimental to the
minorities that the Court once strived to protect.
Other constitutional concepts have not come out of the battle un-
scathed. The Adarand decision has altered the traditional standards
of review by introducing a fourth tier to the framework: a new, per-
missive version of strict scrutiny. As well, the decision has given new
life to the Court's role in the political arena, while simultaneously dis-
279. Converse Constr. Co., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 899 F. Supp. 753, 766
(1995) (citation omitted).
280. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
281. Id. at 1634.
282. Padden, supra note 104, at 1714.
283. Id. at 1713.
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mantling the role of Congress. The doctrine of stare decisis has also
suffered critical injury in that the courts will now more easily abandon
than adhere to the doctrine.
Ironically, in the wake of Adarand, that which has been detrimental
to minorities still remains intact: the effects of racial discrimination.
Adarand demonstrates that in order to combat racism "we must first
take account of race. There is no other way." 284
Margaret A. Sewell
284. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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